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Not too long ago, an academic symposium titled Taking
Administrative Law to Tax would have been just that—academic. For
decades, tax law sat comfortably isolated from administrative-law
doctrines that governed other areas of law. For example, while
administrative-law scholars and practitioners explored the contours of
the Chevron doctrine and challenged agencies that did not observe
the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirements, tax kept plugging
along, with its unique set of deference standards and general
indifference to Treasury’s frequent APA violations.
But things have now changed. Scholars in this Symposium, along
with others, have successfully pushed the tax community to take a
fresh look at long-overlooked administrative-law doctrines and
explore how those doctrines may shape tax practice. Consequently, in
recent years, courts have validated APA–based challenges to
Treasury and IRS actions, when such challenges were not even on the
radar screen a few years ago.
Somewhat ironically, the biggest opening for challenges to
Treasury and IRS actions came through a government victory. In
1
Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States,
the Supreme Court rejected a taxpayer’s claim that tax-specific
precedents governed the degree of deference owed to a Treasury
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regulation. The Court instead “expressly ‘recognized’ the importance
of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of
administrative action” and would not “carve out an approach to
3
administrative review good for tax law only.” Thus, consistent with
the government’s arguments, the Court held that Chevron, and not
National Muffler, provides the appropriate deference framework for
4
Treasury regulations.
By so rejecting tax exceptionalism in the regulatory-deference
context, the Court may have brought general administrative-law
doctrines to several areas of tax administration, with possibly adverse
consequences for the government. For example, under the APA, an
agency generally must provide a reasoned explanation for its actions,
or else face a challenge that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously under
the APA. Although the reasoned-explanation requirement often
proves manageable in the context of quasi-legislative functions (like
rulemaking), Professor Steve Johnson, in his contribution to this
Symposium, explains that the extension of this requirement to IRS
adjudication could raise serious practical and policy problems for the
5
IRS. Several statutes in the Internal Revenue Code require written
determinations for various IRS adjudicative activities, including
jeopardy determinations, collection due process determinations, trust
6
fund recovery penalty determinations, and deficiency notices.
Practically speaking, it would be impossible for the IRS to
provide an extensive explanation for each of these written
determinations. Thus, if a robust reasoned-explanation requirement
applies broadly to the IRS, much of the agency’s day-to-day work
7
could be disregarded as arbitrary and capricious. Luckily, Professor
Johnson concludes that both blackletter law and policy considerations
militate against the extension of the APA’s reasoned-explanation
8
requirement to most IRS determinations. However, Professor
Johnson concludes that collection due process determinations do not
9
warrant such an exception. If Professor Johnson is right, there could
2. Id. at 713.
3. Id. (some punctuation omitted).
4. Id. at 712.
5. Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771,
1776–77 (2014).
6. Id. at 1775–76.
7. Id. at 1813.
8. Id. at 1833–34.
9. Id.
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be significant consequences for the collection due process regime, and
Professor Johnson’s arguments merit close attention.
Although the broad extension of general administrative-law
doctrines could pose challenges for some areas of tax administration,
that extension seems perfectly appropriate when Congress uses the
tax code to accomplish objectives unrelated to core tax policy. No one
seriously doubts, for example, that the APA’s notice-and-comment
requirements apply to the various agencies that prescribe labor
regulations, political activity regulations, healthcare regulations, and
so on. When the tax code contains a grant of regulatory authority
related to those areas, the policy arguments for exceptions from the
APA become especially weak—the mere placement of a labor statute
in one title as opposed to another shouldn’t dramatically alter how
the relevant agency head implements that statute. And in any event,
the tax code contains only a few items unrelated to the core tax
provisions, so applying the APA to nontax regulatory projects
imposes a fairly small burden on Treasury and the IRS.
Or so we all thought. In Administering the Tax System We Have,
Professor Kristin Hickman acknowledges that the tax code is
10
“routinely recognized as a tool in the regulatory toolbox.” Though
Congress has long used the tax code for purposes other than revenue
11
raising, “recent decades have seen a dramatic escalation” in this
practice. And although conventional wisdom dictates that Treasury
and the IRS generally treat nontax provisions as ancillary to the core
tax provisions, Professor Hickman’s novel empirical research shows
otherwise. Of 449 recent major rulemaking projects, a “substantial
12
portion” relate to nontax policy objectives. This undeniably shows
that Treasury and the IRS do, in fact, devote substantial resources
towards administering nontax policies, and legislators concerned with
the proper functioning of the IRS should take this into account as
they inevitably burden the IRS with more tasks unrelated to the
13
collection of revenue.
Courts should also take into account Professor Hickman’s
empirical findings. Those findings may substantially alter current
judicial attitudes towards pre-enforcement review of Treasury

10.
(2014).
11.
12.
13.

Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1726
Id. at 1728.
Id. at 1747.
Id. at 1760–61.
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regulations and the extent to which Treasury can enact retroactive
rules. Although Professor Hickman leaves detailed analysis of these
issues to her future scholarship, her contribution at this stage already
14
provides the bedrock for informed and intelligent debate.
The new challenges and uncertainties facing Treasury
rulemaking might leave one wondering whether Congress should take
a more active role in setting tax policy. In A Case Study of Legislation
vs. Regulation: Defining Political Campaign Intervention Under
Federal Tax Law, Professor Ellen Aprill addresses this question
15
against the backdrop of the so-called Tea Party scandal. That
scandal, which involves allegations of improper targeting by the IRS
of conservative advocacy groups, stems largely from the sad state of
guidance under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4), which grants an income tax
exemption to social welfare organizations. Regulations implementing
the statute nebulously allow any organization to claim the exemption
“if it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the common
16
good and general welfare of the people of the community.” All
agree, or should agree, that this standard requires clarification.
Reformers have proposed both legislative and regulatory
changes, with many believing that a legislative response would give
17
Treasury and the IRS the most flexibility needed to issue guidance.
18
But Professor Aprill astutely explains why the opposite might be so.
The breadth of the current statutory language provides substantial
room for the tax agencies to issue and modify guidance as time
passes. Yet, if Congress steps in and provides tighter definitions in §
501(c)(4), any issued regulations could face the “risk that a court
19
would hold them invalid as inconsistent with congressional intent.”
If one wants to ensure agency flexibility in this area (reasonable
persons might disagree with that goal), Treasury should take the first
step and issue final regulations under existing § 501(c)(4), and flesh
out any ambiguities with other forms of guidance. Courts may more
be more likely to validate agency guidance under this model than

14. See id. at 1761 (noting that although her study was a preliminary analysis, the findings
should undoubtedly “give some pause” to supporters of tax exceptionalism).
15. Ellen P. Aprill, A Case Study of Legislation vs. Regulation: Defining Political
Campaign Intervention Under Federal Tax Law, 63 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1641 (2014).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)–1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990).
17. Aprill, supra note 15, at 1641.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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under a regime in which guidance stems from a new, tightly worded §
501(c)(4).
Speaking of courts, Professor Leandra Lederman explores issues
20
related to tax exceptionalism in the judicial context. Although
federal appellate courts usually review legal questions decided by a
21
trial court de novo, the Supreme Court, in Dobson v. Commissioner,
22
granted deference to the Tax Court on questions of tax law.
Congress seemingly overruled Dobson when it enacted a statute now
codified in I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1), which directs courts to review Tax
Court decisions “in the same manner and to the same extent as
23
decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.”
Yet some believe that the statute leaves Dobson alone, insofar as
review of legal questions go. Thus, an exceptional review standard
would apply to questions of tax law—the Tax Court would receive
deference for its legal conclusions, whereas the federal district courts
and the Court of Federal Claims would not.
Professor Lederman rejects that approach, showing that
commentators who believe that the Dobson rule survived have
misread the relevant legislative history. Nonetheless, even though
Dobson may have been formally overruled, that case continues to
24
cast a “long shadow.” Courts have not quickly embraced
§ 7482(a)(1), and one still finds language in appellate court opinions
suggesting that the Tax Court enjoys deference on legal questions.
Arguably, policy concerns justify the courts’ practice in this regard.
However, Professor Lederman examines those concerns and finds
that an exceptional approach to the Tax Court is “completely
25
unwarranted.”
Professor Lederman’s work highlights a possibly unintended
consequence of Congress’s attempt to strengthen the Tax Court. In
I.R.C. § 7441, Congress removed the Tax Court from the executive
branch and placed it “under article I of the Constitution of the United

20. Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835
(2014).
21. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489 (1983).
22. See id. at 498–503 (explaining the congressional intent behind the formation of the Tax
Court and stating that its findings should be disturbed only when they result from “a clear-cut
mistake of law”).
23. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (2012).
24. Lederman, supra note 20, at 1868.
25. Id. at 1893.
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States,” whatever that means. If Congress wanted to exalt the Tax
Court through this denomination, its statute might have had the
opposite effect. Had the Tax Court remained an agency, its
28
administrative interpretations may have earned Chevron deference,
but as a trial court its legal interpretations earn none, aside from
whatever’s left of Dobson. Of course, insofar as the Tax Court’s
influence goes, whether Chevron applies reflects only one piece of the
overall analysis. But Mayo’s rejection of tax exceptionalism
complicates and possibly diminishes the Tax Court’s role vis-à-vis
other government actors in the tax system.
Returning to Mayo, the Court’s clear and unanimous rejection of
tax exceptionalism might suggest that proponents of an exceptional
approach were either excessively naïve or unabashedly imperious.
But in A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative
Procedure Act, Professor Bryan Camp shows that tax has actually
been at the forefront of administrative law. As he writes, “The world
of the APA started in 1947, but the world of U.S. tax administration
29
began in 1789.” In fact, tax law confronted fundamental
administrative-law questions long before other fields did. Thus,
Professor Camp argues, the APA should not stand as the be-all and
end-all for issues related to tax administration. Tax has a rich history,
and that history can inform issues related to an agency’s authority to
30
issue retroactive regulations, to the proper weight afforded different
31
types of agency guidance, and so on. In other words, rather than

26. 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2012).
27. The idea that Congress can, through a statutory label, determine the constitutional role
played by a government actor seems a bit strange. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
420 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt whether Congress can ‘locate’ an entity within one
Branch or another for constitutional purposes by merely saying so.”). Nonetheless, in Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), the Supreme Court accepted the concept of an Article I
court. But the acceptance of that concept does not cure its inherent contradiction. (How about
an Article III president? Or an Article II legislature?) Given the inherent contradiction
between an Article I entity and the exercise of the Article III judicial power, litigation over the
exact constitutional status of the Tax Court will continue. See generally Marie Sapirie, The
Presidential Power To Remove Tax Court Judges, 137 TAX NOTES 459 (2012) (discussing the
recent challenge to the President’s removal power over Tax Court judges and concluding that
“much more might still be said about the Tax Court's constitutional status”).
28. Lederman, supra note 20, at 1878–79.
29. Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure
Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1684 (2014).
30. Id. at 1709–10.
31. Id. at 1700–06.
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take administrative law to tax, maybe we should take tax to
32
administrative law.
Professor Camp acknowledges that his approach reflects an
inversion of the conventional wisdom. That is, to most, the APA
reflects the general, overarching statute that governs administrative
procedure, and specific statutes, like I.R.C. § 7805(b), reflect
deviations or exceptions from the APA’s default framework.
Professor Camp rejects this “top-down approach that presumes the
33
APA is the primary source of law,” and instead concludes that “the
proper place to start is with the precedents established in tax34
administration cases.”
To the extent that Professor Camp argues that tax and
35
administrative law should include “a two-way conversation,” it’s
hard to quibble with his analysis. Congress did not enact the APA in a
vacuum, nor does the APA operate in one. Surely, courts should not
turn a blind eye to the Internal Revenue Code or to the history of tax
administration when applying the APA. But Professor Camp assumes
a primacy of tax-specific authorities that might run counter to Mayo.
One must eagerly await Professor Camp’s future scholarship that
explores that issue and builds on the historical foundation he neatly
lays here.
Professor Lawrence Zelenak, in Maybe Just a Little Bit Special
After All?, offers a more blunt (if qualified) critique of those who
36
gleefully “danc[e] on the grave of tax exceptionalism.” It’s not just
tax lawyers who believe tax is special, Professor Zelenak argues.
37
Rather, pretty much everyone views tax as a “uniquely byzantine”
area of the law, and the frightening complexity of the Internal
Revenue Code perhaps earns it some special treatment.
It’s hard to dispute that the tax laws are difficult to understand,
but the widespread recognition of that complexity probably stems
more from the annual filing requirements than from tax law’s
complexity vis-à-vis other areas of code-based law. If, à la the filing of
a Form 1040, every individual had to annually determine the priority

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
(2014).
37.

Id. at 1674.
Id. at 1682.
Id. at 1683.
Id. at 1715.
Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1900
Id. at 1908.
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of her creditors’ claims under the bankruptcy code or had to measure
her vehicle’s pollutants under the environmental laws, complaints
about bankruptcy complexity or environmental complexity would
permeate popular culture, just as complaints about the tax laws do.
And although many lawyers express fear of tax even outside of the
filing context—in shying away from enrolling in tax courses during
38
law school, for example —that probably has more to do with the
heavy focus of the common law tradition than tax law’s unique
complexity. That is, the law school curriculum, especially during the
first year, displays a heavy bias towards reading judicial opinions and
away from careful statutory analysis. Thus, in their formative first
year, law students are taught to view the world through the lens of an
39
English common law judge, and they naturally come to believe that
tax, with its focus on statutory and regulatory interpretation, reflects a
quirky and unique body of law.
In the end, the relationship between tax complexity and tax
exceptionalism remains open for debate, but Professor Zelenak
skillfully presents other defenses of tax exceptionalism. The grave
dancers, Professor Zelenak argues, should recognize that tax is hardly
unique in claiming some degree of exceptionalism. Specialists in any
40
field tend to think that their area is, well, special. In this way, “there
41
is nothing exceptional about tax exceptionalism.” And even if broad
issues like agency deference standards do not merit tax-specific rules,
that hardly eliminates the justification for limited forms of tax
42
exceptionalism in other contexts. Professor Zelenak argues, for
example, that there is nothing necessarily exceptional about
interpreting technical tax statutes differently from vague antitrust
statutes. The different interpretive methods may flow from the
application of a general principle (for example, reading detailed
43
statutes differently than vague ones), rather than a deliberate effort
to carve out unique interpretive methodologies for tax alone. Viewed
this way, the “anti” tax exceptionalists overstate the extent to which

38. See id. at 1908.
39. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 7 (1998) (“[The case method] explains why first-year law school is so exhilarating: because
it consists of playing common-law judge, which in turn consists of playing king—devising, out of
the brilliance of one's own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind.”).
40. See Zelenak, supra note 36, at 1909–10.
41. Id. at 1910.
42. Id. at 1919.
43. Id. at 1916.

GREWAL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

4/21/2014 9:12 AM

FOREWORD

1633

tax departs from general principles, especially in the statutory
interpretation area.
In reading Professor Zelenak’s contribution and the other
Articles in this Symposium, one finds himself hopelessly conflicted.
On the one hand, each Article presents forceful arguments, and the
reader will find himself agreeing with much of what each author says.
On the other hand, each Article reflects a unique viewpoint that may
stand in tension with some of the others. Mayo’s rejection of tax
exceptionalism thus has not ended debate regarding the relationship
between tax law and administrative law. Instead, the case may have
just started the conversation. Tax and administrative-law scholars
should both thank the Duke Law Journal for opening the dialogue.

